October 2026 Threat Trend Report on APT Attacks (South Korea)
Content
AhnLab utilized its own infrastructure to monitor APT (Advanced Persistent Threat, an attack that covertly targets specific victims over a long period) attacks against targets in Korea throughout the month of October 2026. The report categorizes the identified attacks by type, compiles statistics, and explains how each type operates.
Purpose and Scope
This report summarizes the distribution methods and malicious behaviors—including spear phishing, attacks exploiting hwp, and unidentified types—based on APT attack cases identified in Korea in October 2026. It also provides the detection names used by the AhnLab product suite along with key IoCs (Indicators of Compromise).
Key Statistics
Most APT attacks identified in Korea were distributed via spear phishing, and in October 2026, attacks utilizing LNK files accounted for the highest proportion. The following cases were identified among spear phishing attacks:
- In Type A, a PowerShell command embedded within the LNK file extracted HEX data to restore a decoy file and a malicious VBS file; it then established persistence through a “Run” registry value before executing commands and transmitting results via a PubNub channel.
- Type B executed mshta, VBScript, Dropbox, PowerShell, or DLL loaders through malicious LNK files disguised as documents uploaded to GitLab, and collected browser login credentials, cookies, cryptocurrency wallet data, keystrokes, and clipboard contents. MeshAgent (a legitimate remote management tool) was also exploited during the attack process.
- Type C involved PowerShell code within an LNK file that created and executed Base64-encoded data in %TEMP%, downloaded decoy files and additional scripts from GitHub, created a Task Scheduler entry, and deployed XenoRAT (remote control malware).
- Type D used LNK, along with additional VBS, Python, and encrypted DLLs from Dropbox, to inject code into caspol.exe, then loaded Xctdoor into memory and executed commands and took screenshots via HTTP communication.
- Type E used Base64-encoded PowerShell to XOR-decrypt decoy files and malicious scripts, registered a Task Scheduler disguised as a Google Chrome update, and then loaded a .NET-based RAT into memory to perform remote control.
- Type F used an LNK file to extract a decoy document and XOR-encoded ZIP data, creating a legitimate AutoIt program and a malicious script. It then exfiltrated system information using the Dropbox API and performed backdoor functions by downloading and executing a BAT command file.
- Type Unknown was distributed via spear phishing but did not fall into any of the preceding categories.
Type G, which utilized hwp, was distributed through Hangul documents that disguised them as defense industry work materials; double-clicking the attachment icon launched WinObj, which then loaded the malicious version.dll via DLL sideloading. Subsequently, a PowerShell backdoor was executed through a scheduled task, and system information and a list of running processes were transmitted to the C2 server, enabling command execution and file transfer.
Conclusion
APT attacks targeting specific victims often began with phishing emails disguised as work-related correspondence. The malware was disguised as legitimate files in various formats, such as executable files and shortcut files; once executed, it enabled the leakage of PC information, the takeover of System Control over infected systems, and the upload of additional malware through backdoors and Infostealers. The report recommended verifying the sender’s identity, refraining from opening files from unknown sources, checking for vulnerable system settings, and keeping the OS, internet browser, and V3 up to date.