Content AhnLab monitored APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) attacks targeting entities in Korea using its own infrastructure. This report summarizes the classification, statistics, and functional characteristics for each type of domestic APT attacks identified during the month of September 2026. Purpose and Scope The report outlines the distribution methods and execution types of APT attacks identified […]

Security Blind Spots Identified by AI The large-scale data breaches disclosed in quick succession in South Korea and Japan in October 2026 mostly originated not from internal core systems, but from peripheral entry points such as externally exposed web services, app backend APIs, and outsourced SaaS (services provided by third-party vendors via the cloud, such […]

Content This Infostealer Trend Report summarizes the distribution channels, number of malware samples, number of detections, and information on companies targeted by new Infostealers (malware designed to steal information) collected during the month of September 2026. The data was compiled based on detection logs from AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) and AhnLab products, and includes […]

While tracking infrastructure related to ValleyRAT, numerous suspicious websites were identified that impersonated companies and brands from Korea such as Doosan Robotics and Cheonjeong. The identified sites used the actual companies’ logos, promotional videos, and descriptions to disguise themselves as official websites. The websites offered features such as invitation-code-based registration, login, fee history inquiries, VIP […]

It is already well known that illegal software and cracked programs can be exploited for malware distribution. Recently, AhnLab identified a new type of information theft malware (Infostealer) disguised as an illegal program. This malware was first detected in mid-August and, after altering its execution method, began spreading widely in September. Notably, it not only […]

Purpose and Scope APT cases disclosed in September 2026 demonstrate that attacks have evolved to exploit the developer ecosystem, cloud services, and network management infrastructure as trust layers. Legitimate software installers, GitHub repositories, Microsoft 365, OneDrive, Telegram, Nostr, routers, and authentication servers were all included in the attack chain. Key Trends Supply chain attacks have […]

Key Summary Since the original ARTEX GitHub repository disappeared, there has been an increase in independent distributions and customized instances based on the existing ARTEX codebase. These distributions are being redistributed with the product name, UI, filesystem structure, agent settings, and language modified, while retaining traces of ARTEX. Key Observations In several instances, ARTEX was […]