July 2025 Major APT Group Trends

July 2025 Major APT Group Trends

Purpose and Scope

This report covers nation-led threat groups, presumed to conduct cyber espionage or sabotage supported by certain governments. These groups are referred to as advanced persistent threat (APT) groups for the sake of convenience. Therefore, this report does not contain information on cybercriminal groups aiming to gain financial profits.

 

We organized analyses related to APT groups disclosed by security companies and institutions including AhnLab during the previous month; however, the content of some APT groups may not have been included.

 

The names and classification criteria may vary depending on the security company or researcher, and in this report, we used well-known names of AhnLab Threat Intelligence Platform (ATIP)’s threat actors.

 

Major APT Group Trends by Region

1)   North Korea

North Korean APT groups actively used the ClickFix technique and carried out DLL side-loading through OLE objects embedded in Hangul Word Processor (HWP) documents.

Kimsuky

 

The Kimsuky group utilized the ClickFix tactic to launch a multi-stage spear phishing attack targeting diplomats and security experts.

Case 1.
Time January, March, and June 2025
Targets ·     Diplomatic, security, international politics, and defense research institutes and portal users in South Korea
·     Experts in diplomacy, security, and international politics in South Korea
Initial Access ·     Emails disguised as those from the media, government officials, or police investigators
·     After gaining trust by sending fake interview requests and meeting invitations, they sent malicious links and documents
Vulnerability Exploited None
Malware and Tools

·         BabyShark: Kimsuky’s main malware series, including various script-based execution

·         QuasarRAT: Used as the final payload in the ClickFix campaign (Proofpoint)

·         Malicious .vbs script: Includes C2 connection, information collection, and scheduler registration features

·         .lnk File (Disguised as Edge Icon): Shortcut file prompting user to click

·         AutoIt Script (HncUpdateTray.exe): Executable file for stealing user information

Technique

·         ClickFix: Prompts users to execute manual commands through psychological manipulation

·         Email spoofing and social engineering (Spear-phishing)

·         Avoiding false detection through multilingual PDF manuals

·         Obfuscating PowerShell code by reversing it

·         C2 communication after executing .vbs and .lnk files

·         Maintaining persistence via scheduled task registration

·         Keylogging and information gathering

Damage

·         Stealing user information

·         Continual C2 connection to infected systems

·         Collecting keylogging records

·         Successfully evaded security and detection

Description

·         Kimsuky employed the ClickFix technique, which is a tactic that prompts users to enter PowerShell commands directly.

·         In January 2025, they distributed a .vbs script via a disguised interview email.

·         In March, they sent a manual that included Code.txt to a U.S. national security advisor impersonating email.

·         The ClickFix technique is designed to trick users into thinking that they are troubleshooting, leading them to manually execute malicious commands.

·         Disguised in various forms, such as a fake portal login page and a job search site in the defense industry

·         After infection, the threat actor’s scheduled tasks are registered, C2 communication is established, and information is collected automatically

·         Related infrastructure (IP, domain) is distributed across multiple countries including Korea, China, and Vietnam

·         In some cases, cloud-based file delivery services such as Proton Drive and Google Drive are used

Source Analysis of the threat case of kimsuky group using ‘ClickFix’ tactic[1]

 

The Kimsuky group targeted South Korea by distributing malware disguised as a Bandizip installer and collected sensitive information through the HappyDoor backdoor protected by VMP.

Case 2.
Time April 18, 2025
Target

·         South Korea

·         Specifically includes government, media, education and research institutions, and think tanks

Initial Access

·         Distribution of a malicious .exe executable file disguised as the Bandizip installer

·         Installing the actual Bandizip program and executing a malicious DLL and remote script

·         Remote code execution through mshta and regsvr32

Vulnerability exploited None
Malware and Tools

·         HappyDoor: A VMP-protected backdoor with features for collecting system information and exfiltrating 6 types of information

·         ut_happy (x64).dll: Implementation DLL for HappyDoor, performing multiple commands using regsvr32

·         Uso1Config.conf: A script file used to store attack commands based on PowerShell

·         mshta: Loading and executing remote HTML scripts

·         regsvr32: Registering and executing malicious DLLs

·         bat script: Self-deleting files and cleaning up the local environment

·         VBScript: Collecting system information and directory files and sending them to the C2

Tactic

·         Disguised as a malicious installer (social engineering)

·         Loading and executing scripts step by step

·         Collecting information using PowerShell and VBScript

·         Using VMP virtualization to protect the backdoor and hinder analysis

·         Concealing using Registry and ADS

·         Executing a multi-stage DLL through regsvr32 parameter combinations

·         Transmitting commands and data via C2 communication

·         Ensuring persistence by creating a scheduled task

Damage

·         Stealing user information (account, system, IP, installed anti-malware, etc.)

·         Collecting key documents (.hwp, .doc, .pdf, etc.) in directories

·         Keylogging, taking screenshots, recording audio, exploring external devices, and collecting files

·         Backdoor for continuous remote control

Description

·         The threat actor distributed the actual installation program and malicious DLL simultaneously through a disguised .exe file that posed as the Bandizip installer

·         When the .exe file is executed, the DLL is installed, initialized, and run in three stages using regsvr32

·         The script collects user information and then transmits it to a specific C2 URL

·         HappyDoor is packed with VMProtect, making it difficult to detect and analyze, and it includes various information collection features.

Source APT-C-55(Kimsuky)组织基于VMP强壳的HappyDoor后门攻击分析[2]

 

Lazarus

The Lazarus group pretended to be conducting a job interview evaluation and set up an attack chain disguised as an NVIDIA update. Using this method, they executed a Python-based malicious script and multi-stage tools.

Case 1.
Time Unknown
Target Threatening to execute malicious scripts on regular users by disguising them as NVIDIA updates
Initial Access

·         Links to disguised recruitment assessment and fake camera access requests, and users are asked to copy commands

·         Prompting the execution of update commands by spoofing the NVIDIA domain

Vulnerability Exploited None
Malware and Tools

·         VBS Script: Downloads malicious archive and executes Python environment

·         Python Script: Heavily obfuscated and includes credential theft, remote access, and data exfiltration features

·         WebBrowserPassView: Browser credential theft tool

·         MailPassView: Email credential theft tool

·         MeshAgent: Installs agent for remote control and persistence

·         PyInstaller EXE: Persistence via FTP-based file and secret exfiltration, Scheduled Task disguised as ChromeUpdate.exe

·         Browser extension and local cryptocurrency folder: Collects and exfiltrates cryptocurrency-related information

Tactic

·         Phishing based on psychological social engineering: Trust-based baiting in job interviews

·         Domain spoofing (NVIDIA): Copying and modifying commands to execute malicious code

·         Obfuscated Python script

·         Stealing browser/email credentials, Installing remote agent, Scheduled task persistence, Collecting and exfiltrating cryptocurrency information

Damages

·         Stealing browser and email credentials → Exfiltration to C2 Server

·         Remote control and ensuring persistence (MeshAgent, scheduled task)

·         Collecting and transmitting cryptocurrency-related information → Possibility of stealing user’s sensitive data and assets

·         Details of the breach such as the specific scale of data exfiltration and system paralysis are not mentioned

Description

·         Tricks users by pretending to be a recruitment evaluation screen and prompts them to copy and execute commands

·         Multi-stage attack including credential theft, remote access, scheduled task persistence, and cryptocurrency information theft by executing Windows-based VBS and then Python

·         An advanced attack chain that involves sophisticated impersonation and object inducement, similar to Lazarus’s “DeceptiveDevelopment”

Source Lazarus’ latest tactics: Deceptive development and ClickFix[3]

 
 


[1] https://www.genians.co.kr/en/blog/threat_intelligence/suky-castle?hsCtaAttrib=191277000884

[2] https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzUyMjk4NzExMA==&mid=2247507111&idx=1&sn=aa2c1910a15aed642f0daf7ef8e38699

[3] https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/deceptive-nvidia-attack