December 2025 APT Group Trends
Key APT Group Trends by Region
1) North Korea
North Korean state‑sponsored threat groups have increasingly relied on fake IT employment schemes, actively exploiting legitimate hiring platforms and fabricated identities to infiltrate corporate environments. These actors frequently take advantage of remote‑work infrastructures to obtain elevated access and conduct long‑term social engineering operations aimed at gaining access to internal systems. Some groups continue to employ loader techniques such as DLL hijacking, while accelerating modifications to their malware delivery methods to evade detection. Overall, recent attacks show a clear evolution toward hybrid intrusion models that simultaneously exploit personnel recruitment vectors and software vulnerabilities.
Famous Chollima
One such case involves the Famous Chollima organization, which used fraudulent remote‑work job postings to infiltrate U.S. and Western companies. Their goal was to obtain internal system access and ultimately secure financial gains through identity theft and unauthorized remote‑desktop control.
| Case 1. | |
|
Time |
· Unknown |
|
Targets |
· U.S. and Western companies |
|
Initial Access |
· Mass outreach and messaging via GitHub repository Pull Requests · Social engineering disguised as a remote IT worker job offer |
|
Exploited Vulnerabilities |
· None |
|
Malware and Tools |
· AnyDesk: Remote desktop access · Google Remote Desktop: Persistent remote access · Astrill VPN: Location obfuscation · Simplify Copilot: Automated job‑application browser extension · AIApply: Automated job application tool · Final Round AI: Real‑time interview assistance AI · Saved Prompts for GPT: LLM prompt‑management tool |
|
Techniques |
· Identity theft and rented/fake identities to obtain employment · Long‑term trust‑building through social engineering · Using AI tools to pass job interviews · Maintaining 24/7 access via remote desktop tools · Location masking through VPN · System reconnaissance (dxdiag, systeminfo, whoami) |
|
Impact |
· Attempts to gain access to internal corporate systems · Requests for victims’ personal identity information (SSN, ID documents, bank details) · Corporate espionage and financial operations supporting the North Korean regime |
|
Description |
· The attackers posed as remote IT workers seeking legitimate employment with U.S. companies. · Victims were asked to provide laptop access credentials and personal identity documents. · The actors maintained remote access using AnyDesk and Google Remote Desktop. · The campaign focused heavily on remote‑work infrastructure abuse and identity theft. · Researchers monitored and recorded the threat actors’ activities in real time using the ANY.RUN sandbox. |
|
Source |
· Smile, You’re on Camera: A Live Stream from Inside Lazarus Group’s IT Workers Scheme[1] |
Famous Chollima disguised itself as fake remote workers, infiltrated companies through recruitment, and then used PiKVM devices to gain covert and persistent access to corporate networks.
| Case 2. | |
|
Time |
· Unknown |
|
Target |
· Corporate environments · Organizations operating remote work hiring processes · Customer environments investigated by Microsoft Incident Response (DART) |
|
Initial Access |
· Successfully obtained employment by impersonating a legitimate remote worker |
|
Exploited Vulnerabilities |
· None |
|
Malware and Tools |
· PiKVM: Hardware‑based remote‑control device enabling full system control as if physically present · Cosmic: Azure analysis tool · Arctic: Azure and Active Directory analysis tool · Fennec: Multi-OS forensic evidence collection tool · Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: Endpoint detection and response · Microsoft Defender for Identity: Identity-based threat detection · Microsoft Entra ID Protection: Identity security telemetry collection |
|
Techniques |
· Impersonation of a remote employee · Bypassing HR and onboarding verification procedures · EDR evasion through hardware‑based remote access (PiKVM) · Maintaining persistent and covert external access · Direct access to internal network data |
|
Impact |
· Potential access to and theft of sensitive corporate data · Persistent unauthorized access tocorporate networks · Long‑term unauthorized access to corporate networks |
|
Description |
· The attackers successfully obtained legitimate corporate accounts by posing as remote employees. · A PiKVM device was physically attached to the assigned work workstation. · Through hardware‑level remote control, the attackers operated the system as though they were physically in front of it. · This method allowed the attacker to bypass EDR controls and carry out unauthorized, stealthy data access operations. · Forensic efforts by Microsoft Incident Response (DART) confirmed a link between the operation and the Jasper Sleet threat cluster. |
|
Source |
· Imposter for hire: How fake people can gain very real access[2] |
Lazarus
The Lazarus Group distributed a malicious RAR archive exploiting the WinRAR path traversal vulnerability CVE‑2025‑8088 to deploy the Blank Grabber Infostealer.
| Case 1. | |
|
Time |
· Unknown |
|
Target |
· Cryptocurrency users · Virtual asset developers · DeFi practitioners · Users of Chromium‑based browsers |
|
Initial Access |
· Distribution of a malicious RAR archive containing embedded scripts · Luring victims into downloading “Pharos.rar” disguised as a legitimate tool · Exploiting the WinRAR vulnerability upon extraction |
|
Exploited Vulnerabilities |
· CVE‑2025‑8088: WinRAR ADS path validation flaw enabling path traversal and arbitrary file creation |
|
Malware and Tools |
· Pharos .rar: Malicious RAR archive · 1 .bat: Executable script masquerading as a Windows Defender update · stub .pyw: Multi‑layer‑obfuscated Python loader · Tsunami Injector: Persistence mechanism and loader for additional payloads · Blank Grabber: Infostealer · PowerShell: Used to show decoy security warnings · Dropbox: Hosting for downloaded malicious scripts · Pastebin: Provides URLs for additional payloads · Telegram: C2 communication channel |
|
Techniques |
· Social engineering via malicious RAR archive · Exploitation of WinRAR ADS path traversal vulnerability · Automatic execution via Startup folder persistence · Multi‑stage obfuscation and dynamic payload loading · Automatic installation of Python environment · Theft of account credentials and cryptocurrency wallet data · Telegram‑based C2 and data exfiltration |
|
Impact |
· Theft of saved browser passwords · Theft of cookies and autocomplete data · Compromise of Telegram session data · Theft of Discord tokens and account information · Theft of seed phrases and private keys from over 20 cryptocurrency wallets, including MetaMask, Exodus, and Electrum · Potential takeover of virtual asset accounts and fund outflows |
|
Description |
· Lazarus distributed a malicious RAR file disguised as “Pharos-Automation-Bot”. · The WinRAR vulnerability allowed creation of a malicious BAT file in the Startup directory. · The BAT script downloaded and executed a Python loader. · The loader then deployed the Blank Grabber infostealer. · The malware targeted browsers, messaging platforms, and cryptocurrency wallets for credential theft. · The attack chain and obfuscation design match known Lazarus tradecraft, attributing the activity to APT‑C‑26. |
|
Source |
· APT-C-26(Lazarus)组织利用WinRAR漏洞部署Blank Grabber木马的技术分析 [3] |
[1] https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/lazarus-group-it-workers-investigation/
[2] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/12/11/imposter-for-hire-how-fake-people-can-gain-very-real-access/
[3] https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzUyMjk4NzExMA==&mid=2247507693&idx=1&sn=e73e1cca5af2ee80c3037daa1dbd2ab1&poc_token=HGokPGmjYq2xcJOaDd5WY4hY5Za-wN0Xy1iNhqJ7