Kimsuky Group’s Malware Disguised as Lecture Request Form (MSC, HWP)

Kimsuky Group’s Malware  Disguised as Lecture Request Form (MSC, HWP)

Recently, malware disguised as a lecture request form targeting specific users was identified. 

The distributed files include Hangul Word Processor (HWP) documents and files in MSC format, which download additional malicious files. Decoy document files used to disguise as legitimate documents have been found to sometimes contain personal information, suggesting that the malware targets specific users. Although the final malicious behaviors have not been confirmed, a script containing the threat actor’s commands is stored and continuously executed on the user’s PC, which could lead to various malicious behaviors such as information leakage and downloading additional malicious code.

The format of the malicious URLs used by this malware is similar to those analyzed in AhnLab’s ASEC blog post in 2023, “Malicious Batch File (*bat) Disguised as a Document Viewer Being Distributed (Kimsuky) [1]“, suggesting that it is suspected to be the same attack group.

 This document explains the behavior of the distributed files and their subsequent actions.


Figure 1. Malware operation process

 

A characteristic of the operation process is the use of a legitimate executable file and a malicious script file disguised as the executable’s manifest file. Additionally, the malware uses Google Drive to receive additional malicious commands by inserting encoded malicious commands into the title of uploaded files to carry out malicious behaviors.

 

The malware is suspected to be primarily distributed through spear phishing, with Hangul Word Processor (HWP) documents and MSC files being identified. The confirmed distributed file names are as follows.

 

File Name

강연의뢰서.msc (Lecture Request Form.msc)

원고작성 세칙.hwp (Manuscript Writing Guidelines.hwp)

강연의뢰서.hwp (Lecture Request Form.hwp)

강연 개요서(pw13579).hwp (Lecture Overview (pw13579).hwp)

Table 1. Distributed file names

The decoy document identified in the same type is as follows.


Figure 6. A confirmed decoy document

 

 

Table of Contents

Overview 
Malware Analysis
1. Distributed Files
1.1 MSC File 
1.2 Hangul Word Processor (HWP) File 
2. Downloaded Files 
AhnLab Response Overview 
Conclusion
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) 
File Hashes (MD5s)
Related Domains, URLs, and IP Addresses
References 

 

MD5

08111135bae27c8aafd08457e95b7380
100e0fdae087054dbc1d8fc364b07e2e
7c451e8d5605536363d897fa9e389ecd
7ed620ca3fdbf2e3900cac5fc99f037f
92ac0465a474e9bb83154c01bb914b52
URL

http[:]//communiquer[.]be/modules/mod_users_latest/src/Helper/0902_pprb/d[.]php?na=myapp
http[:]//communiquer[.]be/modules/mod_users_latest/src/Helper/0902_pprb/d[.]php?na=myappfest
http[:]//communiquer[.]be/modules/mod_users_latest/src/Helper/0902_pprb/d[.]php?na=view
http[:]//communiquer[.]be/modules/mod_users_latest/src/Helper/0907_pprb/d[.]php?na=comline
http[:]//communiquer[.]be/modules/mod_users_latest/src/Helper/0907_pprb/d[.]php?na=myapp