December 2025 APT Attack Trend Report (South Korea)

December 2025 APT Attack Trend Report (South Korea)

Overview

 

AhnLab monitoring APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) attacks in South Korea using its own infrastructure. This report covers the classification and statistics of APT attacks in South Korea that were identified over the course of one month in December 2025. It also provides an overview of the features of each attack type.
 

 


Figure 1. Statistics of APT attacks in South Korea in December 2025

In Korea, most of the identified APT attacks were distributed using the spear phishing method. Notably, attacks using LNK files accounted for the highest proportion in December 2025.

 

APT Group Targets South Korea

The following are the cases and features of APT attacks in Korea identified in December 2025.

 

1) Spear Phishing

Spear phishing is a type of phishing attack targeting specific individuals or groups. Unlike general phishing, attackers gather and analyze information about the target through a reconnaissance phase before executing the attack. Attackers use this gathered information to craft phishing emails, making recipients more likely to perceive them as legitimate. Additionally, email spoofing to forge sender addresses is common. Most spear phishing attacks involve malicious attachments or links within the email, prompting users to execute them.

 

The types of attacks distributed using this technique are as follows.

 

1.1 Attacks Using LNK Files

Type A

This type executes RAT malware. It is primarily distributed as compressed files alongside legitimate files. The LNK files confirmed to be distributed contain malicious PowerShell commands. They download malware using the DropBox API or Google Drive, or create additional script files and obfuscated RAT malware on the user’s PC, such as in the “%PUBLIC%” directory. The RAT malware ultimately executed performs various malicious actions, such as keylogging and screen capture, according to the attacker’s commands. Confirmed RAT types include XenoRAT and RoKRAT.

 

The confirmed filenames are as follows.
 

File Name

20251216 Hyundai International Relations review article(**)Final Submission.lnk
lost_items_form.lnk
Notice_Submission of North Korean Defector Support Project Results and Balance Refund Guidance.lnk
Loan Verification.lnk
Baekjegobun-ro_Songpa-gu.lnk
Transaction Statement for Mr. Choi**.lnk

Table 1. Identified filenames

Type B

 

This type downloads AutoIt malware. When the malicious PowerShell commandin the LNK file is executed, it accesses an external URL and downloads additional files. A key characteristic of this type is that it copies the curl.exe program under a different filename (e.g., WpqNoXz.exe) before executing it. Ultimately, both a legitimate AutoIt program and a malicious AutoIt script are downloaded. The downloaded files are registered in the Task Scheduler to ensure continuous execution. The malicious AutoIt script can perform functions such as executing commands, scanning directories, uploading files, and downloading files.

 

The confirmed filenames are as follows.
 

File Name

2025 North Korean Human Rights Youth Academy Lecture Topics.pdf.lnk
NordVPN Campaign Overview.pdf.lnk
YouTube Campaign Paid Partnership Proposal.docx.lnk

Table 2. Confirmed filenames

 

 

 

The decoy files used to make it appear as if the user executed a legitimate file are as follows.

 


Figure 2. Identified decoy file

 

 

MD5

000197b52c39d68b0fbaae804e035583
0110e34baf46824b2d976c184d3da8a8
04716c31e7443f052e2e3c1203bd6e5b
047d75bd7dc3616b04e87ffeb727cf59
08160acf08fccecde7b34090db18b321
URL

http[:]//chungmu[.]academy/wdFiles/upload/food/handle[.]php
http[:]//mid[.]great-site[.]net/maith[.]php
http[:]//static[.]250[.]232[.]75[.]5[.]clients[.]your-server[.]de/usertheme/colorpicker[.]php?darkmode=false
http[:]//sungshin[.]co[.]kr/skin/member/member[.]php
https[:]//drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1jqpw8UHpsY5ps3nKOfkyo2ql4hC23Mew