December 2024 Threat Trend Report on APT Attacks (South Korea)

December 2024 Threat Trend Report on APT Attacks (South Korea)

Overview
 

AhnLab has been using AhnLab Smart Defense (ASD) to monitor advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks against targets in South Korea. This report will cover the types and statistics of APT attacks in South Korea during December 2024 as well as features for each type.


Figure 1. December 2024 statistics of APT attacks in Korea

APT attacks against Korean targets have been categorized by penetration type, and most were found to be spear phishing. In December 2024, the highest proportion of attacks involved the distribution of LNK files using spear phishing.

 

Trends of APT Attacks in Korea

 

The cases and features for each APT attack type identified in December 2024 are as follows.

 

1.  Spear Phishing

 

Spear phishing is a type of phishing attack against specific individuals or groups. Unlike ordinary phishing attacks, the threat actor conducts reconnaissance before launching the attacks to collect information on and learn about the attack targets. Because the threat actor crafts phishing emails using the collected information, the recipients of the emails are highly likely to believe that they are from a trusted source. There are also cases where the sender’s address is manipulated through email spoofing. Most spear phishing attacks include malicious attachments or links that are intended to lure the user to open them.

 

Types distributed using this technique are as follows.

 

1.1. Attack Using LNK Files

 

Type A

 

This type involves creating a compressed CAB file containing multiple malicious scripts to exfiltrate information and download additional malware. The distributed LNK file contains a malicious PowerShell command, which is used to extract the data of the CAB file and decoy document inside the LNK file, creating them on the user’s PC. The CAB file is then decompressed, and multiple script files (bat, ps1, vbs, etc.) included inside are executed. The executed script files can perform malicious behaviors such as exfiltrating information from the user’s PC and downloading additional files.

 

The confirmed file names are as follows.

 

File Name

#1. Bithumb Korea_Contract.docx.lnk

1.Report on Trading Details of Virtual Assets.hwp.lnk

Instructions on Amending Value-Added Tax Return (Regulation on Value-Added Tax Office Work).hwp.lnk

Appendix 1.Notice of Transaction Details.hwp.lnk

Instructions on Submitting Request for Error Discovery and Correction Report (Enforcement Rule of the National Tax Collection Act).hwp

Table 1. Confirmed file names

 

 

Below is a decoy file that was used to deceive the user into thinking they executed a legitimate file.

 


Figure 2. Confirmed decoy file

 

Type B

 

This type executes RAT malware. They are generally distributed as compressed files alongside legitimate files. The LNK files found in distribution contained malicious PowerShell commands. The malware either downloads using DropBox API or Google Drive, or creates additional script files and obfuscated RAT malware in system folders like “%PUBLIC%” on the user’s PC. The RAT malware executed in the end can perform various malicious behaviors, such as keylogging and taking screenshots, according to commands from the threat actor. XenoRAT and RoKRAT were some of the RAT types found in this case.

 

The confirmed file names are as follows.

 

File Name

January Issue-Open Page.lnk

241205 Full Text from Japan to Mongolia.lnk

Kim*Seong Lecture Material.lnk

To the servicemen of the people’s army in the Russian front line.lnk

Statement(Jung*Yeon).lnk

Interview Request.lnk

Integrative Strategy Research Vol.3 (2024.12).lnk

Korea-Japan Seminar Invitation_Inside.lnk

Korea-Japan Seminar Invitation Materials.lnk

Table 2. Confirmed file names

Below are decoy files that were used to deceive the user into thinking they executed a legitimate file.

 


Figure 3. Confirmed decoy file

MD5

01ff7279011b7af72f6a047121c8f284
08b4bcee92417560d61c5f29649cdfad
0c982f544effe346d0a48e6b9d9081c3
0ceb3d16c8a018943e8c9143c194f81b
1ce2430ff1dd3928cee548b92f769f73
URL

http[:]//118[.]193[.]69[.]53//mail[.]google[.]commailu0ui=5&ik=3a0f03fg06g1&view=log&pxrmmsgid=msg
http[:]//118[.]193[.]69[.]53/mail[.]google[.]commailu0ui=2&ik=3a0f035e61&view=lg&permmsgid=msg
http[:]//118[.]194[.]249[.]90/accounts[.]kakao[.]comwabloginfind_passwordcentinue=/login%3Fconutinue=
http[:]//118[.]194[.]249[.]90/accounts[.]kakao[.]comwabloginfind_passwordcentinue=f384512971340041/97647
http[:]//206[.]206[.]127[.]152[:]8328/