Tracking 3CX Supply Chain Breach Cases using AhnLab EDR

Tracking 3CX Supply Chain Breach Cases using AhnLab EDR

Last March, 3CX supply chain breach cases were a global issue. AhnLab Security Emergency response Center (ASEC) has confirmed through the AhnLab Smart Defense (ASD) infrastructure that malware related to the 3CX supply chain were installed in Korea on March 9th and March 15th.

The 3CX supply chain malware confirmed in this instance had loaded malicious DLLs disguised with the names of regular DLLs, ffmpeg.dll and d3dcompiler_47.dll, on the normal 3CXDesktopApp.exe process, allowing for malicious behavior to be carried out. Ultimately, a downloader shellcode was executed on the memory of the 3CXDesktopApp.exe process. No additional malware downloads were found upon analysis at that time. However, it was confirmed that a data-leaking malware had been executed.

AhnLab Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) is capable of detecting attack techniques used by threat actors to attack 3CX supply chains, and it allows users to check the data required to investigate the related breach case.

Figure 3 is the process tree that is displayed on AhnLab EDR of a 3CX supply chain attack.

ffmpeg.dll is a DLL imported by 3CXDesktopApp.exe. (Refer to Figure 4) Therefore, when 3CXDesktopApp.exe is executed, the ffmpeg.dll that exists in the same folder path is loaded on the memory of the 3CXDesktopApp.exe process.

As shown in the below Figure 5, the loaded ffmpeg.dll reads the d3dcompiler_47.dll that was installed with 3CXDesktopApp.exe, and RC4 decrypts the encrypted shellcode to execute it on the memory.

AhnLab EDR is capable of detecting these abnormal shellcode execution methods. The below Figure 6 is the detection screen that can be found on the [Threats] – [Timeline] tab on the console screen.

If the threat actor’s shellcode is executed, it downloads and executes additional malware from a Github page where a payload has been uploaded. EDR saves the information of download URLs accessed by 3CXDesktopApp.exe, which allows EDR managers to look up information on malware distribution sites in the [Threats] – [Diagram] tab within the EDR console.

AhnLab V3 and EDR products detect this 3CX supply chain threat with the aliases below.

[File Detection]
Dropper/MSI.Agent
Trojan/Win.Loader.C5403102
Trojan/Win.Agent.C5403110
Trojan/Win.Loader.C5403103
Infostealer/Win.Agent.C5403954
Trojan/BIN.Agent
Data/BIN.Encoded
Trojan/OSX.Agent
Trojan/OSX.Loader

[Behavior Detection]
[V3]
Connection/MDP.Event.M4581
Connection/MDP.Event.M11026
Exploit/MDP.Event.M11027

[EDR]
Fileless/EDR.Event.M11072

The MITRE ATT&CK mapping related to this 3CX supply chain threat is as follows.

– T1574.002 : Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
– T1012 : Query Registry
– T1071.001 : Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

.

SHA2

11be1803e2e307b647a8a7e02d128335c448ff741bf06bf52b332e0bbf423b03
210c9882eba94198274ebc787fe8c88311af24932832a7fe1f1ca0261f815c3d
2487b4e3c950d56fb15316245b3c51fbd70717838f6f82f32db2efcc4d9da6de
268d4e399dbbb42ee1cd64d0da72c57214ac987efbb509c46cc57ea6b214beca
2c9957ea04d033d68b769f333a48e228c32bcf26bd98e51310efd48e80c1789f
FQDN

akamaicontainer[.]com
akamaitechcloudservices[.]com
azuredeploystore[.]com
azureonlinecloud[.]com
azureonlinestorage[.]com

To learn more about AhnLab EDR's advanced behavior-based detection and reponse, please click the banner below